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A B S T R A C T
In recent years there has been a growing research interest in the ﬁeld of animal emotion. But there is still little
agreement about whether and how the word “emotion” should be deﬁned for use in the context of non-human
species. Here, we make a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive deﬁnitions. Descriptive deﬁnitions
delineate the ways in which the word emotion is used in everyday life. Prescriptive deﬁnitions are used to pick
out the set of events that scientiﬁc theories of emotion purport to explain. Picking out three prescriptive deﬁ-
nitions, we show that the diﬀerent ways in which emotions are deﬁned correspond to processes that are dis-
tributed diﬀerentially across the animal kingdom. We propose that these deﬁnitions provide a useful starting
point for investigating the varying emotional capacities of a wide range of animals, providing a basis for a new,
comparative science of emotion.
1. Introduction
Whether and to what extent diﬀerent animals experience emotions
of one kind or another is an important scientiﬁc question; it is also one
that to date has proven extremely diﬃcult to answer. This is a key
problem for the study and practice of animal welfare, as an animal’s
capacity to experience suﬀering is a prerequisite for any welfare con-
cern. But the extent to which diﬀerent species share facets of the
emotional processes identiﬁed in humans is also a question for com-
parative psychology and neuroscience. What are the fundamental fea-
tures of emotions, and how far into our evolutionary past do they
stretch? When emotional disorders occur in people (as in major de-
pression, generalised anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, etc.) can they
be understood in terms of the responses of emotional processing sys-
tems that were originally adapted for a more ancient, even pre-mam-
malian, way of life? And to what extent are the behavioural and neu-
ropharmacological facets of emotions shared between people and the
species used as models to study these disorders? When we can answer
questions about the similarities and diﬀerences between humans and
other species in their emotional processing, it may be possible to ﬁnd
out, not just about the emotional lives of diﬀerent animals and the
implications this has for their welfare, but also about the building
blocks, limitations and potential sources of disorder of human emo-
tional processes too.
To date, comparative studies of psychological processes have fo-
cused most extensively on cognitive capacities such as short and long-
term memory, abstract learning and concept formation (e.g. see
Olmstead and Kuhlmeier, 2015; Pearce, 2008), but very little on emo-
tional ones. However, interest in the emotions of animals has increased
considerably in recent years, and the time is right to start to redress this
imbalance (Panksepp, 2011). To do this, we need to be clear about what
we mean when we talk about animal “emotions”. Our starting point is
the search for a deﬁnition of emotion that can be applied to both human
and non-human animals alike (e.g. de Waal, 2011; Lang, 2010; LeDoux,
2012). In this paper, we address the often controversial issue of deﬁning
emotions in animals by focusing on the distinction between two types of
deﬁnition; prescriptive deﬁnitions and descriptive deﬁnitions. First, we
oﬀer a descriptive deﬁnition which sets out a broad area of interest for
comparative emotion research across humans and other species. We
then go on to consider in detail three prescriptive deﬁnitions of emo-
tion. Each of these contemporary deﬁnitions has been designed to de-
lineate the types of processing that should be considered “emotional”,
and each has the potential for drawing a diﬀerent line between species
that can and cannot be considered to have the capacity for emotions. No
one of these deﬁnitions is superior to the others; we argue that they are
all valuable in illustrating the layers of processing that comprise human
emotional processing, components of which are likely to be present to
diﬀering degrees in diﬀerent species across the animal kingdom.
2. Deﬁning emotion in animals
What is an emotion? And how can we make use of our human
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understanding of the word to talk about and investigate such processes
in animals? For many early ethologists and experimental psychologists,
emotion was too human and too quintessentially subjective to be in-
corporated into the scientiﬁc investigation of animals. When Tinbergen
was constructing his four questions of ethology (Tinbergen, 1963), the
discussion and use of emotion terms in the context of animals was al-
ready largely taboo, and worries about the legitimacy of discussing
emotion within the animal sciences continued for many years there-
after. So, deﬁnitions can be problematic and need to be applied to
constructs like emotion with caution. Even attempting to deﬁne emo-
tion in the human context has caused problems (e.g. see Gendron, 2010;
Izard, 2010), and the diﬃculty is magniﬁed in non-human animals who
cannot tell us whether or what they feel. In these cases, notions of the
internal or consciously experienced states are essentially inaccessible.
Nevertheless, the past decade or so has seen a dramatic increase in
interest, particularly within the neurosciences, but also in ethology, in
the topic of emotion and how it can be studied translationally in both
humans and animals (e.g. Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; de Waal, 2011;
Lang, 2010; LeDoux, 2012; Rolls, 2014).
A major and pertinent distinction when attempting to deﬁne emo-
tion is the possibility of constructing both descriptive and prescriptive
deﬁnitions (Widen and Russell, 2010). A descriptive deﬁnition is a
dictionary-style deﬁnition – one that aims to set out, as comprehen-
sively and accurately as possible, the ways in which a word is used by
people, in a given language, and in everyday life (e.g. see LeDoux et al.,
2016). A prescriptive deﬁnition is somewhat diﬀerent; it is a deﬁnition
of the concept or construct that is used to pick out the set of events that
a scientiﬁc theory (in this case of emotion) purports to explain. Here,
emotion theorists take key features of what people think of (i.e. de-
scriptively deﬁne as) emotions and say “this is what I am talking about
when I use the term emotion in my research” (e.g. Izard, 2010).
Both types of deﬁnition are useful for thinking about animal emo-
tions. To start by sketching out a realm of interest when considering the
notion and implications of “emotion” in the animal context, a de-
scriptive deﬁnition of the word as we use it in the human context is
invaluable. If we were to launch straight into making a prescriptive
deﬁnition for the purposes of research, we may produce one that is too
far removed from the real-world human phenomenon that we are in-
terested in, or one that is simply too narrow in its focus.
Below, we have constructed a simple example of a descriptive de-
ﬁnition of the English term “emotion”:
“An emotion is a multicomponent response (subjective, physiolo-
gical, neural, cognitive) to the presentation of a stimulus or event.
The conscious, subjective component of an emotion is generally
regarded as its central, key feature.
It is always valenced (i.e. either positive or negative; occasionally
both).
It can be intense or mild; long lasting or brief.
The exact type of emotion experienced (e.g. sadness, grief, remorse)
will depend on the precise nature of the emotive (emotion-producing)
event.
An emotive event can be external or internal (i.e. emotions can be
generated by imagination and recollection as well as by events occur-
ring in the environment).
An emotive (i.e. emotion-producing) event is usually one that is in
some way important to the goals or relevant to the well-being of the
individual.
If an emotive event is reliably predicted, that prediction will also
often generate an emotional response.”
This deﬁnition identiﬁes the many components that make up peo-
ple’s emotional experiences and acknowledges the centrality of sub-
jective feelings in our everyday use of the term “emotion”. It also ac-
knowledges the varied, fuzzy and complex nature of the emotion
construct (Lang, 2010), with words such as “usually”, “occasionally” or
“often”. And while not an exact replica of other previous deﬁnitions, it
shares the features of many (also like many of these, it may come close
to, but perhaps not perfectly encapsulate, the meaning of the word, e.g.
see Izard, 2010). For example, “Emotions are aﬀectively charged,
subjectively experienced states of awareness (LeDoux, p291, in Ekman
and Davidson, 1994); ‘Emotion is a complex set of interactions among
subjective and objective factors …. which can (a) give rise to aﬀective
experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) gen-
erate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual ef-
fects, appraisals, labelling processes; (c) activate widespread physiolo-
gical adjustments to the arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behaviour
that is often, but not always, expressive, goal directed and adaptive’
(Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981, p355); “Emotions are typically eli-
cited by external events……typical emotion episodes contain a number
of components. There are thoughts, bodily changes, action tendencies,
modulations of mental processes such as attention, and conscious
feelings” (Prinz, 2004, p3).
By deﬁning emotion in the way we have done, we can point to sorts
of comparative problems of emotion that interest or concern us. For
example, we might want to say “I am interested in whether certain
animals experience emotions in a similar way to humans” or “I want to
ﬁnd out whether birds and mammals diﬀer in the range of emotions
that they show”. This is a useful shorthand; a way of indicating that we
are interested in this domain of research because of our own human
experience of it. It is also a convenient way of outlining the structure
and scope of the domain that we want to investigate; the term “emo-
tion” circumscribes a domain that is separate from other English lan-
guage terms such as “motivation”, “sensation”, “perception” and
“cognition”. A descriptive deﬁnition such as this can help researchers of
emotion delineate the issues they propose to explore.
Diﬀerent sorts of deﬁnitions, however, are needed for the actual
execution of emotion research. As Barrett (2006) pointed out, emotions
deﬁned in this descriptive manner are cultural constructs, not “natural
kinds”; that is, they do not necessarily represent basic biological
structures or processes. Moreover, we believe that the term “emotion”,
as deﬁned descriptively, is simply too human-centred and quintessen-
tially subjective to be applied without ambiguity to non-human animals
(see also LeDoux et al., 2016). For research on animal emotion to go
forward, it is useful to be able to put to one side (for a time, at least)
concerns and debates about whether and in what ways animals ex-
perience emotions consciously. To identify, catalogue and study the
core structures and processes of emotion, and to study these in animals
in particular, we need objective, prescriptive deﬁnitions. This is not to
say that conscious experiences of emotion are not central to our un-
derstanding of emotions or to our concerns regarding whether and to
what extent animals can be said to possess emotional capacities. Rather,
we propose that by prescriptively deﬁning emotions and emotional
processes in such a way that they can be studied objectively in animals
is a vital ﬁrst step on the path towards any future understanding we
may achieve of non-humans’ subjective emotional experiences.
3. Prescriptive deﬁnitions
In recent years a number of researchers have oﬀered deﬁnitions
explicitly for the purpose of investigating emotion in animals and hu-
mans alike (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; de Waal, 2011; Lang, 2010;
LeDoux, 2012; Rolls, 1999, 2005, 2014). Others have done this im-
plicitly, focusing on particular, objectively identiﬁable facets of emo-
tional processing in non-human species (e.g. Panksepp, 1982; Berridge
and Kringelbach, 2008). These have been prescriptive, not descriptive
deﬁnitions. Animal emotion theorists have taken key features of human
emotions and said “this is what I’m talking about when I use the word
emotion in the context of the animals I study”. Below, we will consider
three of these deﬁnitions in detail, taking them as examples of the ways
in which deﬁning emotions prescriptively in diﬀerent ways can lead to
diﬀerent answers to key comparative questions about the extent and
distribution of emotions in the animal kingdom.
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3.1. Emotional building blocks
Anderson and Adolphs (2014) deﬁne emotion very broadly as “an
internal CNS state that gives rise to physiological, behavioural, cogni-
tive (& subjective) responses”. The word “subjective” is kept in par-
enthesis to indicate that they do not expect that all animals will ne-
cessarily produce this component. With this deﬁnition, they propose the
study of “emotion primitives” in animals. They see these as similar to,
but not necessarily homologous with, human emotions. That is, they
accept that diﬀerent phyla and diﬀerent species within those phyla may
have evolved very diﬀerent approaches to dealing with the similar sets
of problems that they encounter in the environment: responding to
threat and responding to opportunity.
Central to Anderson and Adolphs (2014) deﬁnition is the proposal
that emotions comprise four key components or building blocks: Va-
lence, Scalability, Persistence and Generalisation. All four of these, they
argue, can be seen as key facets of human emotions. They suspect that
these building blocks evolved to serve many independent behavioural
and cognitive functions, but that over time they have combined in the
brain to produce what we humans now regard as emotion states. But
these four primitives, they argue, occur in some form in a very wide
range of animal species. And those species which show evidence of all
four primitives can be said to be said to have a capacity for “emotion” in
this broad sense.
Valence is to do with the opposites that humans experience in
emotion: joy vs. anger, happiness vs. sadness. At a subjective level,
valence is one of the core features of emotions (and what separates
emotional feelings from sensations or perceptions) (Russell, 2003;
Barrett et al., 2007; Prinz, 2010). Anderson and Adolphs (2014) point
out that in many animals, similarly opposing pairs can be evidenced in
behaviour. The primary example of this is approach and withdrawal
from an object or stimulus; a young foal, lamb or calf will approach its
mother for milk, but withdraw from a novel, loud or moving stimulus
(e.g. see Schneirla, 1959). A ﬁsh will behave similarly when faced with
either a tasty reward or a potential punisher (e.g. Ramasay et al., 2015).
And even the roundworm, C. elegans, will make use of its olfactory
senses to either approach or with draw from stimuli (de Bono and
Maricq, 2005; Sengupta, 2007). In fact, the approach/withdraw re-
sponse is part of the repertoire of most if not all motile animals because
it is universally adaptive – enabling an organism to escape from po-
tential threats and approach potential opportunities.
Scalability is another key feature of human emotions that Anderson
and Adolphs (2014) argue is both central to their own emotion deﬁ-
nition and present in many animal species. Humans can report on the
intensity of an emotion and also on the degree of physiological acti-
vation or arousal that accompanies a particular valenced state (Duﬀy,
1957; Russell et al., 1989). This scalability, like valence, seems likely to
have fairly universal adaptive signiﬁcance. If a threat is greater or
nearer, it is useful to be able to run away faster. If an opportunity is
greater, working harder to obtain it is also likely to be worthwhile
(Trimmer et al., 2011).
In humans, emotion words map changing levels of intensity of
emotional reactions (e.g. anxiety, fear, panic; glad, happy, ecstatic).
These words are illustrative of two key aspects of the scalability of
emotions: as the intensity of emotional reactions change, human ex-
periences (and emotional/expressive behavioural) shift both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. Similar, scaled shifts can be seen in the beha-
viour and physiology of animals behaving in a valenced manner. For
example, a rat that has been food deprived and therefore values its food
rewards more highly, is likely to lever press more rapidly, and/or sus-
tain this pressing for longer, in order to obtain them (e.g. see Collier
et al., 1992; Hodos, 1961). A domestic hen will run more quickly down
a runway to obtain a higher quality food reward (Davies et al., 2015).
These are quantitative changes in behaviour that can be recorded and
used as measures of the intensity of emotional responses. Qualitative
changes, in the form of behavioural switches, can also be observed and
used as measures of emotional scalability. For example, octopi and
squid switch from crypsis behaviour to ink jetting and propulsion when
potential threats increase (e.g. see MacGinitie and MacGinitie, 1968)
while rats and many other mammals will switch from freezing to ﬂight
behaviour as a predator (or predator-like stimulus) approaches (e.g.
Bolles and Fanselow, 1980; Blanchard et al., 1998).
Interestingly, Anderson and Adolphs (2014) note that to date there
are relatively few examples of response scaling (either qualitative or
quantitative shifts) in invertebrates. Nevertheless, examples do exist,
such as the behaviour of squid and octopi described above (MacGinitie
and MacGinitie, 1968), the varying levels of behavioural arousal/in-
tensity observed in the fruit ﬂy (D. melanogaster) (Chen et al., 2002; Van
Swinderen and Andretic, 2003; Greenspan et al., 2001), and observa-
tions that crickets (G. bimaculatus) show some intensity-related beha-
viour switching in aggressive encounters (Stevenson et al., 2005).
Persistence is pinpointed as another key characteristic of emotion,
according to Anderson and Adolphs’ (2014) prescriptive deﬁnition.I In
many mammals, heart rate, blood pressure, and the levels of a number
of stress hormones can remain elevated for many minutes, and some-
times for hours, following exposure to a threat or other stressor. And in
humans, the subjective components of states such as anxiety or sadness
can persist even longer, for hours, days, weeks or months. In some in-
stances, these sorts of persistent changes might simply reﬂect extended,
stimulus-response driven (e.g. reﬂex) eﬀects. But there are also cases
where repeated, small-scale stimulation events can lead to extended
responses. For example, Drosophila exhibit a persistent state of elevated
locomotor activity following repeated stimulation by air puﬀs; the more
puﬀs applied, or the more intense the puﬀs, the more persistent the
resulting locomotor activity (Lebestky et al., 2009).
Animals that show persistent behavioural, physiological and cog-
nitive responses to rewarding and punishing stimuli may be better able
to deal with repeated threats or opportunities that occur in their en-
vironment. For example, such a capacity for persistence is likely to be
particularly useful for species for whom threats and/or opportunities
are temporally correlated; that is, when one good or bad event is as-
sociated with a heightened probability of other events of the same va-
lence occurring in the near future (e.g. as would be the case when a
reward-rich foraging patch is discovered or an area of high predation
risk is entered). Anderson and Adolphs (2014) point out that persis-
tence of response is an observed feature of the behaviour of many
species, including invertebrates. However, any possible links between
the capacity or tendency to show persistence of responding, and the
behavioural niche of an individual species, remains to be explored.
The fourth and ﬁnal “emotion primitive” that Anderson and
Adolphs’ (2014) deﬁnition of emotion proposes is Generalization. This,
they argue, leads on from persistence, to the extent that an emotion
state induced by one stimulus can generalise into subsequent, diﬀerent
contexts and thereby inﬂuence responses to other (diﬀerent) stimuli.
And like scalability, the capacity for generalization distinguishes emo-
tional responses, as prescriptively deﬁned by them, from reﬂexive ones.
For example, an insect’s response to an aversive stimulus (e.g. a shadow
– Card and Dickinson, 2008), may either be a reﬂexive response to
imminent threat, or it might involve a persistent internal state that can
generalise to other contexts or aﬀect subsequent behavioural decisions.
Cognitive biases are an example of ongoing responses to threat of
punishment or prediction of reward that generalise beyond the trigger
stimulus or stimuli (e.g. Harding et al., 2004; Paul et al., 2005; Mendl
et al., 2010). In cognitive bias paradigms, animals’ responses to am-
biguous stimuli, which might predict higher or lower levels of reward,
or either reward or punishment, appear to be shifted according to the
animals’ prior experience with unrelated rewards and punishers. While
mostly studied in mammals (e.g. Burman et al., 2011; Parker et al.,
2014; Douglas et al., 2012) such generalised emotional responses have
also been found in birds (e.g. Deakin et al., 2016; Brilot et al., 2010),
and even insects (Bateson et al., 2011; Perry et al., 2016).
Emotions as prescriptively deﬁned by Anderson and Adolphs (2014)
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extend into many branches of the animal kingdom’s phylogenetic tree,
including some invertebrates such as the much-studied fruit ﬂy (D.
melanogaster) or the even, perhaps the roundworm (C. elegans). At a
practical level, the four building blocks they propose are a potentially
useful way of splitting up the multiple processes involved in emotions
into easily identiﬁable units that make studies in such a broad discipline
more manageable. They also provide the opportunity to investigate the
neural processes involved in each of these diﬀerent aspects of emotional
processing. Anderson and Adolphs (2014) provide good evidence that
particular insect species demonstrate some fundamental features of
emotional processing, prompting further research questions regarding
the extent to which these features are analogous to or homologous with
those features that occur in human emotional processing.Their identi-
ﬁcation of these phylogenetically early “emotion primitives” also
prompt further questions about the extent to which other species, and
particularly other invertebrates, demonstrate these features, as well as
the questions of whether all these features necessarily occur together,
and whether the presence of emotion primitives can tell us anything
about the capacity of such species to suﬀer or have poor welfare
(Sherwin, 2001).
3.2. Emotions as states elicited by instrumental reinforcers
In recent years, Rolls (1999, 2005, 2014) has been the most pro-
minent advocate of a reinforcement-based, prescriptive deﬁnition of
emotion for animals. Following on from a long and slowly developing
understanding of the strong link between reinforcement theory in ani-
mals and the descriptive construct of emotion in humans (e.g. see
Thorndike (1911), Watson (1929), Harlow and Stagner (1933), Amsel
(1962), Millenson (1967), Weiskrantz (1968), Gray (1975, 1981)), Rolls
has set out a deﬁnition of emotions as “states elicited by rewards and
punishers, that is, by instrumental reinforcers” (Rolls, 2014, p14). He
goes on to clarify what he means by rewards and punishers: a reward is
something for which an animal will work and a punisher is something
that an animal will work to escape or avoid.
This is a prescriptive deﬁnition that is intended for use in studies of
humans and animals alike. It comes close to being an operational de-
ﬁnition too – one that, through its objective and procedural nature (i.e.
not just “this is what I am talking about when I use the word emotion in
my research”, but “this is what you need to do to measure an emotion”),
can enable directly comparable studies across species. And it provides
the added beneﬁt of proposing a gold standard for the level of emo-
tional response that can be measured – work (Rolls, 1999, 2005, 2014).
Unlike Anderson and Adolph’s emotion primitives, it seems that
Rolls anticipates some degree of homology between human and non-
human emotional processes, although, like other animal emotion re-
searchers (e.g. LeDoux, 2012), he points out that this homology does
not necessarily imply that emotional states, so deﬁned, are experienced
consciously in all animals. From a comparative point of view, the re-
inforcement-based deﬁnition of emotion that Rolls (1999, 2005, 2014)
proposes provides a reasonably distinct boundary between animal
species that exhibit evidence of emotional processing in this sense and
those that don’t; Rolls is clear that the capacity to show “true” instru-
mental reinforcement is a pre-requisite for demonstrating emotion ac-
cording to his deﬁnition, and rules out species that only show responses
to rewards and punishers that are evolutionarily established responses
or reﬂexes (Miller and Konorski, 1969). For example, he points out that
a single celled organism that “works” to obtain a food reward by
swimming towards it across a chemical gradient is not acting on the
basis of instrumental reinforcement because it is not performing an
arbitrary, learned action, but rather a reﬂexive response to cues pre-
dicting nutrition (Rolls, 2014, p47).
The distinction between truly instrumental and more automatic
forms of behavioural control is a well-discussed dividing line in com-
parative and experimental psychology (e.g. Tolman, 1932; Hull, 1943;
Spence, 1956; Bolles, 1972). For example, take a choice situation in
which an animal needs to “decide” which action it should perform to
obtain a food reward. Eﬀectively, the question the animal has to answer
is: which action has the highest value? Critically, the value of pro-
spective actions are determined in more than one way (Dolan and
Dayan, 2013). Under Pavlovian control, the “value” of the action is
determined by the animal’s evolutionary history, and the action will be
eﬀected more or less automatically given the presence of a particular
set of stimuli (e.g. a proboscis extension in response to sucrose in the
honey bee or a ﬁxed-action crumb peck in response to the sight of food
in day old chicks). Under instrumental control, the value of an action is
learned as result of an individual’s experiences of the outcomes con-
tingent on that action. The classic example of this is the lever press of an
experimental rat (Bolles et al., 1980). In Rolls’ deﬁnition, when a food
pellet is delivered to the rat, an emotion occurs, and this emotion up-
dates the value (i.e. the expected value for future choice situations) of
the lever pressing action. So, instrumentally driven behaviour – in
which a novel response is reinforced by a reward (or diminished in
frequency by a punishment) is, according to Rolls’ deﬁnition, the key
behavioural indicator of the presence of emotion in an animal. By ex-
tension, only species that can demonstrate “true” instrumental learning
can qualify for inclusion as animals with the neural capacity for emo-
tion.
The problem for those researchers trying to establish which species
or groups of animals do and do not have a capacity for instrumental
learning – and therefore “emotion” in the sense of Rolls’ deﬁnition – is
that in many (perhaps most) situations, a given behavioural response
cannot easily be attributed to either instrumental or Pavlovian valua-
tion processes, and may well be the product of both (Rangel et al.,
2008). A number of behavioural phenomena, including constraints on
learning (e.g Hinde and Stevenson-Hinde, 1973), autoshaping (Brown
and Jenkins, 1968) and negative automaintenance (e.g. Williams and
Williams, 1969), all illustrate the diﬃculty of developing paradigms for
generating “true” or “pure” instrumental learning. Famously, Breland
and Breland (1961), who trained animals to perform quaint and quirky
behaviors for entertainment displays and advertisements, noticed that
Pavlovian foraging and feeding behaviors often either fragmented or
prevented instrumental training in a range of species, including tame
racoons. Similarly in autoshaping, animals appear to perform instru-
mental responses (e.g. a pigeon performing a feeding-like peck at a cue
key that predicts the delivery of food), but this behaviour is simply a
classically conditioned foraging response towards the cue (key) that
predicts food reward. In negative automaintenance paradigms, the set-
up is identical to autoshaping paradigms, except that performing a re-
sponse such as pecking a key light that predicts food, is inversely as-
sociated with the food reward.In such studies, where the instrumental
value of an action is pitched against its Pavlovian value, a variety of
species including pigeons, rats and dogs (Williams and Williams, 1969;
O’Connell, 1979; Sheﬃeld, 1965) have been shown to fail to develop
instrumental responses in the face of compelling Pavlovian stimuli.
A potential solution to the diﬃculties involved in trying to diﬀer-
entiate behaviour resulting from “true” or “pure” instrumental learning
concerns the generalised tendency of many animals to approach stimuli
that predict reward. Any instrumental training that incorporates ap-
proach towards the reward dispenser (e.g. approaching a lever for lever
press) is likely to be trained easily because it involves a strong
Pavlovian component (Jones et al., 2017). Hershberger’s famous
looking glass experiment Hershberger (1986) was designed to see
whether chicks (four day old domestic hens) could go against their
Pavlovian tendencies to approach a food reward dispenser and learn to
do the opposite – to walk away from food – in order to obtain reward.
The chicks predominantly failed; they were unable to make use of the
instrumental contingency to consistently supress their impulses to ap-
proach the sight of food. Whether or not adult chickens can perform this
task remains an unresolved question.
A number of other studies have, however, found evidence for in-
strumental conditioning that is relatively uncontaminated by Pavlovian
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elements, using instrumental paradigms with bidirectional elements.
For example, Grindley (1932) rewarded guinea pigs for turning their
heads either to the left or the right at the sound of a buzzer. Not only
were both of these opposing actions similarly accessible to training (i.e.
neither one appeared to be advantaged or disadvantaged by some
hidden Pavlovian control), they were also able to be reversed (e.g. left
turn replaced by right turn) by a reversal of the instrumental con-
tingency.
The question of which species of animal unambiguously show the
capacity for instrumental learning remains an open one. To date, no
systematic attempt has been made to catalogue which animals can and
cannot be shown to have this ability (see Dickinson and Balleine, 1994,
p3). And there are potential problems with such an endeavour. Many
diﬀerent species would need to be tested, with a clear understanding
that factors such as the species’ unique behavioural ecology, and the
individual’s current stress levels and prior learning experience could
play an important part in determining whether such capacities are
found (e.g. see Mendl, 1999; Meagher et al., 2015).
It is generally accepted that the most traditional and commonly
employed instrumental paradigm, in which rats learn to produce ac-
tions such as lever presses or chain-pulls, can be said to be instrumental
in nature (Skinner, 1938; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). Evidence in
support of this comes from Bolles et al. (1980), who found that rats
could perform bidirectional instrumental learning of lever pressing and
chain pulling. And although mice show some diﬀerences from rats in
the form of their learning (e.g. Frick et al., 2000, Jones et al., 2017),
there is no reason to suppose that their learning of lever pressing and
other similar behaviors is anything other than instrumental. But there is
still a surprising dearth of evidence for many other species. It seems
likely that a fairly large range of animals have the capacity for basic
instrumental learning, and should therefore qualify, according to Rolls’
deﬁnition, as having the capacity for emotion of some kind. But we
simply do not yet know whether and which kinds of birds, reptiles, ﬁsh,
amphibians, or even invertebrates will show unambiguous evidence for
this kind of learning, either using the bidirectional paradigm or other,
similar procedures.
3.3. Emotions as states that mediate goal directed learning
The third prescriptive deﬁnition of emotion that can be applied to
both human and non-human animals also concerns instrumental be-
haviour, but focuses on just one facet of this. It considers a process by
which shifts in the value of a reward can gain control of the in-
strumentally learned actions that allow the animal to gain access to (i.e.
work for) that reward. It is well known that motivational shifts (e.g. a
growing need for water or food as time since these were last consumed
increases) can change the amount of work done by an individual
(human or non-human) to achieve a reward. Being able to calculate
changes in the expected value of rewards is an important capacity for
many animals, enabling them to alter their behavioural decisions
readily in the light of new circumstances, including those resulting from
their own shifting needs (as in hunger and thirst) and also those re-
sulting from changes in the external world (e.g. when a food source that
was once valuable becomes contaminated by bacteria and is now
harmful). It is therefore not surprising that a number of diﬀerent pro-
cesses or mechanisms have evolved to enable animals to re-value re-
sources according to these many and varied changes. Dickinson and
Balleine (1994, 2000, 2002, 2009), Balleine and Dickinson (1998a,b,c)
focus on one particular process by which this re-evaluation can occur,
and in so doing provide a new delineation of emotional processing to
add to our list. The theory of emotion that they derived from this is
Hedonic Interface Theory (HIT; Dickinson and Balleine, 2009); a theory
which aims to explain the origins of subjective, consciously experienced
emotions.
Although HIT was not originally thought of as a prescriptive deﬁ-
nition of emotion, it can readily be thought of as such. If we leave to one
side for a moment the question of whether the type of emotional pro-
cessing being deﬁned in this way is likely to be consciously experienced
or not, Dickinson and Balleine (1994, 2000, 2002, 2009), Balleine and
Dickinson (1998a,b,c), like Rolls (2005, 2014), consider emotions to be
states that are elicited by rewards (or punishments). But they also go
one step further by proposing that emotion, in its role as a hedonic
interface, is a constituent part of one type of instrumental conditioning
in particular: goal directed learning (Dickinson and Balleine, 2009;
Dolan and Dayan, 2013).
In habit-based instrumental conditioning, a given action on the part
of the animal (e.g. lever press by a rat) establishes an expected value – a
likelihood of being performed again in similar circumstances – on the
basis of one or more experiences of the outcome of that action (Wood
and Rünger, 2016). That is, the animal learns to lever press more when
lever presses are followed reliably by a reward, and less when they are
followed reliably by non-reward, the omission of reward, or a punish-
ment. Importantly, this type of learning does not need to incorporate
any knowledge of what kind of reward or punishment is expected. That
is, the animal may ﬁnd itself performing an instrumentally reinforced
action without any understanding of what reward it will lead to.
Goal-directed instrumental conditioning, on the other hand, is more
sophisticated, to the extent that the action becomes associated not only
with an expected value, but also an expected identity (Dickinson and
Balleine, 1994). That is, there is knowledge (in some form – see
Dickinson (1980), for discussion of this) that a reward of a particular
kind (e.g. food pellets, water, sucrose solution, etc.) is likely to result
from the instrumental action. Colwill and Rescorla (1985) and Adams
and Dickinson (1981) were the ﬁrst to produce demonstrations of this
kind of learning, using devaluation paradigms. For example, Colwill
and Rescorla’s rats learned that pressing a lever would produce one
type of food reward (e.g. sucrose solution) and pulling a chain would
produce a diﬀerent type (e.g. food pellets). The animals then went on to
have one or other of their rewards devalued by pairing reward delivery
with aversion-inducing Lithium Chloride (LiCl) injections. In sub-
sequent tests of their willingness to perform either of the learned in-
strumental actions (lever press/chain pull), the frequency of the action
associated with the devalued reward was reduced signiﬁcantly more
than that of the non-devalued reward, thereby demonstrating that each
of the actions were understood by the rats to be associated with their
respective outcomes. Another illustration of goal-directed learning
comes from devaluation studies in which animals demonstrate reac-
tions resembling surprise when an expected reward suddenly di-
minishes in quality or value (e.g. Tinkelpaugh, 1928).
Key to Dickinson and Balliene’s interest in goal directed learning,
and its relevance to the prescriptive deﬁnition of emotion, is a parti-
cular detail regarding the process by which goal directed actions
change their value. Based in part on ideas originally put forward by
Tolman (1949), Balleine and Dickinson (1991), Balleine (1992) hy-
pothesised that when a novel reward such as sucrose solution is deva-
lued, either as a result of pairing with LiCl injection, or simply as a
result of satiation, rats would not automatically reduce their instru-
mental responding to obtain them. Instead, they thought that learning
might need to take place in the new state: that the animals would ﬁrst
have to sample the reward following devaluation, in order to under-
stand that under these new and diﬀerent circumstances, the previously
rewarding resource had lost much of it value. Similarly, they hy-
pothesised that an increase in the value of a reward (e.g. a food reward
following food deprivation) would also need to be experienced in this
new state (of hunger) for the goal-directed instrumental value of that
reward to be re-drawn.
Eﬀectively, Balleine and Dickinson (1991), Balleine (1992) were
proposing that animals would have to go through a process of dis-
crimination learning to make full use of goal-directed instrumental
conditioning, and this is what they found; rats appear to need to learn,
that the value of a novel food is greater (i.e. produces a more positive
response) when an animal is food deprived, or that of a novel drink is
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greater when the animal is water deprived. In an early study, Balleine
(1992) trained non-food deprived rats to lever press for either high-
protein food pellets or a polysaccharide solution. They were then tested
in extinction, to see how much lever pressing they would perform to
access these rewards, but on this occasion one group of rats was food
deprived and another was not. Because these rewards were novel to the
rats, and therefore none of the animals had experienced their heigh-
tened value during food deprivation, no diﬀerence in lever pressing rate
was seen. But when another group of rats were given pre-exposure to
one or other of the novel food rewards under food deprivation, these
rats did change their lever pressing behaviour in line with the new
valuation of the rewards.
Dickinson and Balleine (2009) proposed that emotions mediate goal
directed learning by bringing together an animal’s Pavlovian and goal-
directed control systems’ responses to a rewarding (or punishing) sti-
mulus. Their starting point was the observation that when actions that
enable an animal to obtain a reward are under Pavlovian control (that
is, when they resulted either from automatic, unlearned stimulus-re-
sponse associations, or classically conditioned stimulus-response asso-
ciations) changes in motivation for these rewards (e.g. due to food or
water deprivation) cause immediate shifts in both eagerness to work for
these rewards and choice (e.g. whether to opt for a food or water re-
ward). But in goal-directed learning, no such automatic re-evaluation
takes place (see above – Balleine (1992)). They suggest that an evolved
capacity for “emotion”, which they suggest is consciously experienced
in these cases, brings together these two systems. In essence, their idea
is that emotions, prescriptively deﬁned, evolved for the purposes of
binding together information from more primitive, aﬀective systems of
reward and punishment valuation and more recently evolved and
complex cognitive systems allowing for goal directed learning.
Making use of a prescriptive deﬁnition of emotion as states elicited
by rewards and punishers in animals that have a capacity not just for
instrumental conditioning but goal directed conditioning in particular,
limits any potential discussion of emotion in animals to a relatively
small number of species. That is, while a large number of species, in-
cluding many mammals and birds are likely to fall into this category,
many more from the wider animal kingdom will fall outside of it. Since
they were ﬁrst introduced, the ﬁndings by Dickinson, Balleine and
others have been widely inﬂuential, particularly in the broader ﬁelds of
aﬀective neuroscience and reinforcement learning (e.g. Dayan and
Balleine, 2002). But at a practical level, demonstrating goal directed
learning in animals is a complex and demanding task, resulting in a
relative dearth of information regarding its spread across the animal
kingdom, including among non-mammalian species. Of these, birds,
and particularly some bird groups such as the corvids, are excellent
candidates for exhibiting these sorts of capacities (e.g. see Clayton
et al., 2005), although the revaluation experiments conducted with rats
have not so far been replicated in any animals apart from rats.
4. Discussion
We acknowledge that what we humans like to call ‘emotion’ is
something that is unique to our species (and even our own individual
culture) and that many animals have emotional or emotion-like capa-
cities that are very diﬀerent to our own, based on neural systems of
response to and anticipation of rewards and punishments that are
deeply specialised for the niches those animals occupy. But we also
argue that empirical questions can be asked about the capacities of
diﬀerent animals to ‘do’ emotion according to diﬀerent prescriptive
deﬁnitions of the term. By asking these questions of a wide range of
animal species, a much clearer picture will begin to emerge regarding
the structure and nature of emotional processes in humans and animals
alike. This will be important and relevant, not only for our under-
standing of animals and their welfare, but also for our understanding of
human beings, and the behavioural, physiological and neural under-
pinnings of the emotions and emotional disorders we experience.
Our proposal for a comparative science of emotion does not aim to
ignore or diminish variations in emotional processing and function
across species, but to recognise and investigate them. It is already well
understood that cognitive capacities and specialisms are uniquely
adapted to individual species’ environmental and behavioural niches
(e.g. see Macphail, 1982), and emotional capacities are likely to be si-
milarly specialised. This is often seen most clearly amongst island
species that have had minimal contact with predators for many gen-
erations and as a result become fearless in the face of novel threats (e.g.
Blumstein, 2002). While such examples could be viewed as a reduction
of a previously extant emotional capacity, other diﬀerences between
species may concern more fundamental and long-lasting adaptations to
an animal’s ecology, such as whether it is predominantly a predator or
prey, or a grazer or an opportunistic forager (e.g. Trimmer et al., 2011).
We expect to see cross-species diﬀerences, but also similarities and
hierarchies of capacities. This comparative approach is not, however,
an easy challenge. Studying emotional or aﬀective capacities in species
not previously thought of as ‘emotional’ can be controversial (Mendl
et al., 2010, 2011, Mendl and Paul, 2016). The language used is all
important in such cases; perhaps in the future it will be possible to both
develop and agree technical terminologies which avoid the confusion
and conﬂict which is currently so common in this area (e.g. see LeDoux,
2012).
Another major challenge for a comparative science of emotion is the
sheer quantity of research needed. Not ﬁnding evidence of a particular
emotion primitive (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014) or of a particular type
of learning (Rolls, 2014, Dickinson and Balleine, 2009) is not by itself
evidence of its absence, in either an individual or a species. This is an
issue that also besets comparative cognitive research, and can only be
overcome by the gradual accumulation of data, usually from multiple
researchers, taking many diﬀerent methodological approaches. It is also
an issue that is counterpointed by another – publication bias in the
communication of negative results. To fully understand emotional and
emotion-like processes in a wide range of species, both positive and
negative ﬁndings will need to be considered, even if their implications
are weighted diﬀerentially (e.g. see Matosin et al., 2014).
So, which animal species can we say have emotions of some kind
and which do not? The short answer is that it depends on how we deﬁne
emotion. If we deﬁne emotion descriptively, it is not possible to say
much about animal emotions at all – we can simply point towards them
as vague possibilities of similar but not identical constructs. If we deﬁne
it prescriptively, diﬀerent deﬁnitions will give us diﬀerent sets of
‘emotional animals’. At ﬁrst glance, this might seem like an empty
conclusion – of course the types of animals that we consider to have
emotions will depend on deﬁnition. But the devil is in the detail. The
prescriptive deﬁnitions we have outlined here describe diﬀerent facets
of emotions and some of the diﬀerent levels or layers of complexity that
the emotion systems of humans and many other animals exhibit.
Emotions as we experience (and culturally construct) them must ulti-
mately be based on “natural kinds” (Barrett, 2006) – biological pro-
cesses adapted to the everyday demands of survival and reproduction.
But they are not just one process; they are many – like the layers of an
onion, diﬀerent but linked emotional processes have evolved across the
course of human evolution and the evolution of other species too. We
still have much to discover about the many facets of emotions and their
roles in behavioural control (e.g. see Dayan and Berridge, 2014, Bach
and Dayan, 2017), and as developments are made, the potential for new
prescriptive deﬁnitions of emotion will arise.
Like other human-centred constructs, such as intelligence, emo-
tional processes are made up of many parts and there will be no simple
linear relationship between capacity for emotionand phylogenetic re-
latedness or complexity (Pearce, 2008). Nevertheless, broad homo-
logies and analogous processes do exist in the emotional structures and
capacities of non-human animals, and the in hierarchical levels of
emotional processing that these may represent, and these have been the
focus of our attention in the present review. For the present, we have
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chosen set aside the issue of whether and in what ways non-human
animals might be conscious of the emotions we can prescriptively de-
ﬁne. Most of the researchers we have cited here do the same, although
some (notably Dickinson and Balleine, 2009) have speculated about the
types of emotional processing that may be inextricably linked with
conscious experience. Perhaps, as both comparative emotion research
and consciousness research progress into the future (Boly et al., 2013),
it will be possible to make even better speculations and inferences re-
garding the experiences of emotions in animals.
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